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A call to resist illegitimate authority

Newsletter #170

November 1984

U.S. Ready to Intervene
in Gulf War
JOE STORK
MARTHA WENGER
This article, which is reprinted from
MERIP Reports, July-September
1984, outlines the history of U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq war. While
we recognize that this article is a bit
more "technical" than the material
which usually appears in Resist, we felt
it important to cover a subject which
has been given little coverage in either
the mainstream or the left press. As
with the conflicts in Central America,
this is another region where the U.S. is
using the promise of military weapons /
and support to bend the political tide in
its favor. Unlike response to intervention in Central America, there is little
vocal opposition to or familiarity with
U.S. involvement in this war. We urge
everyone to learn more about the conflict in the gulf. For more information
we recommend the special July-September issue of MERIP. Single copies
are $4.50 and can be obtained by
writing the Middle East Research and
Information Project, Box 1247, NY,
NY 10025. Subscriptions to MERIP
are $18/year. - Eds.

The

current phase of the war between Iran and Iraq has prompted a
level of U.S. military intervention in
the Gulf region that is new and unprecedented in both qualitative and
quantitative terms, and holds the risk
of a more direct combat role on Iraq's

rn-;S Midway battle group in the Indian Ocean.

behalf. Since early 1983, the stalemate
in the war appeared to be working in
Iran's favor. Its greater weight in terms
of population and economic resources
gave it the edge in a strategy of attrition. Beginning in the fall of 1983, Iraq
threatened to counter by attacking
Iran's oil exporting capacity. This campaign finally began in March and April
1984, with missile attacks against oil
tankers near Iran's Kharg Island
loading facility. Iran's measured response - "an eye for two eyes," as
one U.S. official put it - forced a two
week halt in this phase of the war,
although Iraq resumed these attacks at

the end of June. Iran, meanwhile, has
had several hundred thousand combatants, perhaps half a million, poised
along the southern front for another
''final offensive.'' Most observers
believe that whatever the differences
within the Islamic Republic leadership
there will indeed be one more major offensive. If this offensive fails, the war
will nevertheless go on, at least at the
level of continued border clashes, for
as long as the two major protagonists,
Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, remain in power.

Continued on Page Three

THE PLEDGE OF RESISTANCE
If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise signficant-

ly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join with
others to engage in acts of nonviolent direct action at U.S. federal facilities, inlcuding U.S. federal buildings, military installations, congressional offices, offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other appropriate places. I pledge to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in order to
prevent or halt the death and destuction which such military action would cause
for the people of Central America.
Name (Print)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City/State _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip_ _ __
Tel. ______________ o you need nonviolence training? _ __
Name of affinity group_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

THE PLEDGE
OF WITNESS AND SUPPORT
If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise

significantly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join
others in protesting that miliatary action by nonviolenting vigiling at U.S. federal
facilities and other appropriate places. I also pledge to support those who engage
in acts of nonviolent civil disobedience in order to prevent or halt further death
and destruction in Central America.

letters
Combatting Homophobia

Dear Friends:
A few issues ago you published a
gratuitous editorial that, after a few
paragraphs of waffling and footshuffling, came down against supporting gay rights struggles within the
military. I was not the only one to
write in protest of the implicit homophobia of those remarks. I see from
the July/August issue's page 2 article
"We Are Everywhere!" that indeed
your thinking is changed. That last
paragraph deserves to be carved in
stone for all future generations of
strugglers.
But there are apparently those who
can't overcome their homophobia so
successfully, namely the letter-writers
whom you've answered so eloquently.
The enclosed check will make up for
one month of canceled pledges. It is
sent with the hope that many more
Resist supporters will respond in a
similar fashion.
Eric Gordon
NY,NY

Name (Print)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City/State _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip_ _ __
Tel. ______________ o you need nonviolence training? _ __
Name of affinity group _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
___ Please contact me concerning _pre-invasion vigils and actions.
_ _ I would like to volunteer to work on the EMERGENCY RESPONSE
NETWORK.

___ Suggested donation of $2 or more to help meet the expenses involved in
organizing this pledge. (Make checks payable to EMERGENCY
RESPONSE NETWORK.)
Please mail this pledge to:
EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK
American Friends Service Committee,
2160 Lake Street, San Francisco, CA 94121 (415) 752-7766
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The Resist Newsletler is published ten
times a year by Resist, Inc., 38 Union
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Gulf War
Continued from Page One

This prescription would seem to fit
the objective of the United States as
formulated recently by Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Murphy,
who told a congressional committee
that "a victory by either side is neither
militarily achievable nor strategically
desirable." 1 Since last fall, though,
Washington's strategic desire to see no
victor in the Gulf war has required a
greater U.S. political and even military
intervention on Iraq's behalf. "We
want to keep Iraq in the field and get
the war ended, n was how one State
Department official characterized
Washington's definition of neutrality. 2
Washington's neutrality has been extremely flexible from the beginning of
this war. Iraq relied heavily on Western
intelligence evaluations of Iranian
military capabilities when it invaded
Iran in September 1980, and leading
Iranian counterrevolutionary figures
such as General Gholam Ali Oveissi
visited Washington and Baghdad in the
weeks prior to the war.
Once full-scale war erupted, U.S.
military involvement in the region, if
not with the combatants themselves,
became significant. Four days after the
Iraqi invasion, on September 26, 1980,
the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia
dispatched an urgent but vague
message that the kingdom's leaders
wanted U.S. military help. High level
Carter administration officials met to
assemble a series of options and debate
which one they would like the Saudis to
request. Defense Secretary Harold
Brown and National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the crisis as
an opportunity to transfer to Saudi
Arabia 40 F-14 figher planes from the
aircraft carrier U .S.S. Eisenhower,
already in the Arabian Sea, a similar
number of F-15 fighters from U.S. air
bases, and to send several hundred
U.S. military technicians to operate
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles there. In
the view of some military officers, the
war gave the U.S. leverage to extract
more intimate Saudi collaboration with
the long-term build-up of U.S. military
forces in the region.
Secretary of State Edmund S.
Muskie took a more cautious tack,
arguing that a major military intervention in the Gulf would undermine
assertions of U.S. neutrality in the war
and violate the mutual nonintervention
pledge the administration had made in
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a meeting between Muskie and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
on September 25. The debate was complicated by intelligence reports that
Oman and Saudi Arabia were about to
allow Iraq to launch attacks from their
airfields.
On September 28, Brown, Brzezinski
and Muskie agreed that USAF Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft
(AWACs) should be sent immediately
and were assured by Pentagon officials
that F- l 4s from the USS Eisenhower
could reach Saudi Arabia in less than
two hours if needed. General David
Jones, chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, happened to be in
Saudi Arabia at the time. He was
directed to get a formal Saudi request
for the AW A Cs and to dissaude them
and the Omanis from allowing Iraq to
use their facilities. 3
By October 9, four U.S. Air Force
(USAF) AW A Cs were providing 24
hour-a-day coverage of Iraqi and
Iranian battle movements northward
as far as Dizful and scanning Iran's oil
terminal on Kharg Island and its oil
fields along the Gulf Coast. U.S.
military personnel screened all the intelligence gathered, passing on to the
Saudis only what the U.S. considered
necessary for their defense. Another
carrier battle group joined the USS
Eisenhower in the Arabian Sea, and
within three weeks the number of U.S.,
French, British and Australian warships in the area had doubled from 30
to 60. A U.S. ground radar station
flown in to Saudi Arabia enabled ''all
American units there to talk to each
other, to talk to the fleet centered on
two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea
and to communicate with American
military headquarters in Europe.'' The
official number of U.S. military personnel there had jumped from around
400 to around 800 in the weeks since
the war began. 4
The dispatch of the USAF AW ACs
led directly to the Reagan administration decision in early 1981 to sell five
AW A Cs to Saudi Arabia as the centerpiece of an integrated regional air
defense system built to U.S. specifications to host any eventual intervention
by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.
The AW A Cs agreement, according to
military analyst Anthony Cordesman,
provided each Saudi air base with the
''service facilities, refueling capability,

parts and key munitions in place to accept over-the-horizon reinforcements
for [70] USAF F-15 fighters. No conceivable improvement in U.S. airlift or
USAF rapid deployment and 'base
basing' capability could come close to
giving the U.S. this rapid and effective
reinforcement capability. "s An added
advantage was that the Sa.udis paid for
it all.
"55-45 Percent Neutrality"

Under Reagan, the AWACs-centered military construction proceeded
apace, mainly in Saudi Arabia but also
in Oman and Bahrain. The U.S. also
endorsed the efforts of the Saudi-led
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to
integrate the Gulf states' air defenses
into a single network. Policy in the
Gulf war continued to be one of professed neutrality. The temptation to
lure Baghdad away from the Soviet
Union, which had cut off arms supplies
to Iraq, was tempered by a concern not
to alienate Tehran any further, since
Iran remained the "strategic prize" in
the region. One White House official
candidly described the resulting
balance recently as a "55-45 percent
neutrality" in favor of Iraq. 6 Early on,
in March 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Congress he noted
"some shift" in Iraq's policy reflecting
a "greater sense of concern about the
behavior of Soviet imperialism in the
Middle East. m Several weeks later, the
State Department lifted a freeze on the
sale of five Boeing passenger aircraft to
Iraq, and Assistant Secretary of State
Morris Draper met top Iraqi officials
in Baghdad. In 1982, the administration removed Iraq from the list of
countries officially regarded as supporting "international terrorism,"
paving the way for credits and exports.
In April 1982 the administration
allowed Iraq to purchase between six
and twelve LlOO transport aircraft
"for civilian use. " 8 When Iran turned
the tide of the war in June-July 1982,
the State Department announced that
the U.S. was prepared to hold joint
military exercises with states in the
region.9 Early in 1983, by which time
Iraq was staring bankruptcy in the
face, the administration granted some
$400 million in credit guarantees for
Continued on next page
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Gulf War
Continued from Page Three
the export of U.S. wheat and other
agricultural commodities to Iraq. This
not only supplied Iraq with badly
needed foodstuffs; more significantly,
it demonstrated political and financial
support to other prospective creditors,
including Arab and European governments and international banks.
The fall of 1983 posed again, as in
September 1980, the question of direct
U.S. military intervention in the war,
or at least more explicit backing for
Baghdad. Against a background of
reports that Iraq was losing the war of
attrition, the National Security Council
decided in October to continue an official policy of "military neutrality"
while informing U.S. allies in Europe
and the Gulf that an Iraqi defeat
"would be contrary to U.S. interests."
Five Ways to Tilt

This further "tilt" towards Iraq
took five different forms. First, the
U.S. encouraged its allies to make major weaons deliveries to Iraq. Ironically, at the same time the Soviet Union
had resumed arms supplies to Iraq
which it had cut off when Iraq invaded
Iran. Washington dropped altogether
its reservations about the French decision to "loan" Iraq five Super Etendard jet fighters equipped with Exocet
anti-ship missiles for Baghdad's
planned tanker war, and carefully ignored a major French airlift of
weapons in October. Second,
Washington encouraged Iraq's Arab
allies to resume financial assistance to
Baghdad. High level State and Defense
Department emissaries toured the Gulf
in October, December, February and
again in April. Washington also endorsed the participation of U.S. banks
and construction companies in several
schemes to increase Iraqi oil exports by
building new pipelines through Jordan
and Saudi Arabia. Third, Washington
began pressuring allies and clients including Israel, South Korea and
Great Britain - to halt all military
related sales of weapons or spares to
Iran, and by June the administration
was bragging through its favored columnists that supplies to Iran had
"dried up." 10
Fourth, the Reagan administration
played along with the Iraqi tanker war
talk. In response to Iranian statements
that it would permit no oil exports
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from the Gulf if its own exports were
cut off, Reagan warned on October 20,
1983, that ''the free world'' could not
''stand by and allow anyone to close
the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian
Gulf." More recently, after Iraqi and
Iranian warplanes had hit some dozen
tankers in the Gulf, Reagan backed
Iraq even more explicitly. He declared
that "the enemy's commerce an,d trade
is a fair target," while Iran's attacks
against the ships of third party allies of
Baghdad, and Tehran's refusal to negotiate a settlement, placed its tactics
'' beyond bounds.'' 1 1
Fifth, the administration ordered
further planning for U.S. military intervention in the event of an Iraqi collapse. After the Marine barracks in
Lebanon were bombed in late October, Defense Secretary Weinberger told
a congressional committee that proof
of Iranian involvement would justify
U.S. military aid to Iraq. Washington
announced in February that its warships in and near the Gulf had orders
to shoot any aircraft approaching
within five miles. On February 26,
1984, the guided missile destroyer USS
Lawrence fired on an Iranian P3 patrol
plane when it flew within two and a
half miles of the Lawrence. 12 As Iran
claimed success in taking Iraq's Majnoon Islands oil field, a "high-ranking
administration official'' told the
Philadelphia Inquirer that the administration was prepared to send
ground troops to the Gulf. 13 In late
March the New York Times reported
from Baghdad that "Western European diplomats assume that the United
States now exchanges some intelligence
on Iran with Iraq, 14 and Saddam Hussein seemed to confirm this in early
May when he told a Kuwaiti newspaper
that ''we have benefitted from the
AWACs in lraq." 15
When the State Department's
Richard Murphy visited the Gulf in
April, he was accompanied by Rear
Admiral John Poindexter, head of the
Crisis Pre-planning Group within the
NSC. Murphy's and Poindexter's message to the ruling families was that any
U.S. military intervention on their behalf against Iran would require a
public invitation and full U.S. access to
their bases. Their mission was to obtain Gulf states' permission to store additional ammunition, fuel and weapons for use by a U.S. intervention

Resist Newsletter

force. U.S. military commanders had
long maintained that the new Central
Command (as the Rapid Deployment
Force is now called) required landbased facilities and headquarters in the
Arabian Peninsula, and the escalating
war against the tankers represented
another opportunity to secure Saudi
acquiesence.
There are signs, though, that the administration remains divided over how
far to escalate U.S. intervention behind
Iraq in order to consolidate the U.S.
military presence in the region. Some
officials complain about Saudi resistance to a larger U.S. ground presence there, while others favor a more
cautious approach. "Arab reluctance
will save us from our own
impetuosity," was how one State
Department official put it. 16 European
governments have also warned
Washington against indulging its impulse to "bash" Iran. 11 As a result, the
U.S. contented itself to send Saudi
Arabia new "improved" A WACs able
to track ships as well as aircraft, 400
largely symbolic Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles and, more significantly, a
USAF KC-10 aerial tanker. This was
not needed to refuel the AW A Cs or
Saudi F-15s. Several smaller KC-135s
already there were handling this task.
The KC-10, though, would enable U.S.
fighter bombers based on carriers in
the Arabian Sea to attack Iranian targets in the northern Gui f.
The latest crisis has also forced
Kuwait to re-evaluate its military ties
with Washington. That country had
until now declined to join the
U .S.-sponsored air defense network
based around the AWACs. A U.S.
Central Command survey team visited
Kuwait in June, and at the end of the
month the administration announced
Kuwait would buy millions of dollars
worth of military equipment and
would tie in with the Saudi air defense
system. 18 Regular flights of USAF
C-48 cargo jets into Gulf airports suggest that some degree of prepositioning of military equipment and
supplies has been going on. 19
At the same time, Washington has
stepped up its tacit intervention on
Iraq's behalf by providing U.S. warships as tanker escorts, starting in the
third week of May. Officially, the
escorts are for tankers chartered by the
Navy's Military Sealift Command to
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provide fuel for U.S. forces at sea and
abroad. The Pentagon asserts that only
four U.S. warships have been operating in the Gulf, but observers there
believe there may be as many as 12. 20
The escorts are operating only in the
southern, Arabian side of the Gulf,
thus threatening to repulse Iranian but
not Iraqi attacks; there have been no
sightings of U.S. tanker escorts in the
vicinity of Kharg Island.
Washington's current view appears
to be that any escalation of the tanker
war should be handled initially by the
air forces of the various Gulf states.
''The feeling here is that they should
get bloodied first," said one U.S. official. 21 With 300 modern fighters (185
of these belonging to Saudi Arabia),
these forces should be more than a
match for Iran's 60 to 70 vintage Phantoms and handufl of F-14s. The lack of
a direct Iranaian response to the loss of
a Phantom in a June 5 dogfight with
Saudi planes over the middle of the
Gulf has encouraged the Pentagon in
this view. As in the June 5 incident,
U.S. involvement in any such confrontation would be considerable, with the
AW ACs providing intelligence and
flight guidance and the aerial tankers

providing refueling. Pentagon officials
reportedly gave "mixed reviews" to
the "Peninsula Shield" military exercises held by the Gulf Cooperation
Council in late 1983. ''The maneuvers
showed us how far the Gulf states have
come, but also how badly they need
us," was one U.S. official's verdict. 22
Other U.S. regional allies outside the
Gulf are also involved. In late June,
Saudi defense officials met with Jordan's King Hussein, Pakistan's dictator Zia ul-Haq and the Egyptian
chief of staff to discuss the war. 23 All
three countries provide pilots, officers
and military technicians to the Saudi
and other Gulf military establishments.
There are two scenarios which pose
the danger of direct U.S. military intervention against Iran. One involves the
likely consequences of an Iranian attack on U.S. warships in the Gulf,
especially in their tanker escort function, or against Saudi oil installations.
This sort of incident would probably
shift the balance in Washington decisively in favor of those who would
like to repair the post-Lebanon prestige
of the U.S. at Iran's expense. Iran's
very cautious behavior in the tanker
war so far makes such a development

unlikely but possible.
Prospects for such escalation depend
much more on the outcome of the
ground war, and particularly of the
long-awaited Iranian attack on Basra.
If Iraqi defenses hold, officials in
Washington expect that increased oil
exports through new pipelines after another year or so will enable the Saddam
Hussein regime to repair its economy
and political base. 24 On the other hand
if Iran scores a significant
breakthrough, Washington expects its
long-awaited "invitation" from
Riyadh to intervene directly. This
would involve sending between two
and four USAF F-15 squadrons to be
based in Saudi Arabia. From there an
air offensive against Iranian air bases
and troop concentrations would enable
Iraq to hold its own in the land battles.
"I feel confident that within mintues,
we could certainly stabilize that situation border-wide," one U.S. military
official said in May. 22 This would represent the penultimate step in the ''incremental'' policy of escalation that
Washington has followed for the last
year of this war. Do those U.S. officials who talk of an intervention
lasting ''minutes'' remember that this
war was supposed to be over in a few
weeks when Iraq sent its forces over the
border in September 1980?

Joe Stork and Martha Wenger are
editor and assistant editor of MERIP
Reports.
Footnotes
1. Christian Science Monitor,June
14, 1984.
2. Newsday, May 20, 1984.
3. New York Times (NYT), October 12, 1980.
4. NYT, October 8, 1980.
5. Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf

Effigies of Saddam Hussein in Teheran

and the Search for Strategic Stability
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984),
p. 325.
6. Middle East Policy Survey
(MEPS), May 11, 1983.
7. NYT, March 20, 1981.
8. Washington Post (WP), April
14, 1982.
9. WP, July 17, 1982.
10. Federal investigators also
cracked down at home, and in late
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Grassroots Report: CAPA
Last February Resist gave CAPA a $488
grant for the production of a slide show.

Rachel Wyon and David Truscello
We are teaching people of all ages.
People who never had the opportunity to
go to a school. We do this because we
consider education a right that we will not
wait to exercise. That is why in the midst
of this conflict, in spite of the suffering,
we are offering classes beneath the trees,
teaching students as our territory is bombarded with mortars and bombed by
helicopters sent by your government.
ANDES representative
- Marta Alicia Rivera
at the MTA Conference on Civil and
Human Rights, January, 1984.

In

the complex debate over U.S. policy

in Central America, it is often difficult to
get back to basics. "CAPA - Educators
in Support of ANDES" has been working
to provide basic information about the effects on education of the U.S. maintained
war in El Salvador, and about the efforts
of the Salvadoran opposition forces organized under the umbrella of the FDRFMLN to prepare their people for participatory democracy in spite of the
government.
CAPA - Comite de Apoyo Pro-Alfabetizacion (The Literacy Support Committee) was formed two years ago by a
group of people from various nations
who wanted to help inform people internationally about the literacy campaign organized and promoted by the National
Association of Salvadoran Educations
(ANDES 21 DE JUNIO). The literacy
campaign, begun in 1981, is making it
possible for the Salvadoran people to
''read about their own reality in order to
write their own history." ANDES has
taken its work to the refugee camps and
cooperatives of Central America and the
areas of El Salvador controlled by the
FDR-FMLN. Currently, about 25,000
people are involved in literacy and postliteracy classes as learners or popular
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volunteer teachers. (Support committees
like CAPA are spreading the news of the
success throughout France, Sweden,
Canada and the United States.)
In Boston, CAPA has completed many
support projects. It has produced a slide
show about the literacy campaign and
uses it as an educational tool in schools,
teachers' unions and churches. It has sent
speakers to teachers' conferences and
conferences on peace issues. It has helped
organize a tour of North American
teachers to Nicaragua. And in January of
1984, CAPA helped anchor the EastCoast ANDES tour of Marta Alicia
Rivera, the union's representative in the
United States. The tour of Marta Alicia
successfully carried the Salvadoran
teachers' urgent message of peace to
unions and churches, schools, and media
in cities from Boston to Burlington VT,
and from New York to Washington.
As a result of the tour, CAPA and
ANDES have developed relations with
the Massachusetts Teachers' Association
and the Boston Teachers' Union. Both
unions lent their support to the ANDES
tour. And the BTU (AFT Local 16) approved a resolution supporting the efforts
of ANDES and their literacy work,
donating $1,000 to purchase educational
materials to be sent to ANDES in
Nicaragua through Oxfam America's
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Tools for Peace Campaign.
On June 21, 1984, Boston area teachers
and students and their friends celebrated
together with members of CAPA to commemorate the 20 years of organized struggle of the Salvadoran teaching profession
under the leadership of ANDES. The
event, which included Latin food, local
musicians, breakdancers from Chelsea
and Mission Hill middle schools, and the
CAPA slide show, was a fund raiser for
the CAPA sponsored Educators Tour to
Nicaragua. At this event CAPA announced its new name: "CAPA - Comite
de Apoyo Pro-ANDES - Educations in
Support of ANDES". This name reflects
the fact that ANDES is becoming increasingly recognized throughout North
America and Europe where many
ANDES solidarity committees have been
set up, similar to CAPA. The name also
indicates more accurately the work of
CAPA, which supports both the Literacy
Campaign and the very important union
work carried out inside El Salvador. During its 20 years of struggle, ANDES has
won the respect and recognition of the
people of El Salvador, but is has also been
targetted by the government and repressed severely. Since 1979, 323 teachers
have been murdered, 68 teachers have
been captured and are now disappeared,
and many teachers have been arrested,
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with three currently in prison. Even today, with new "democratic" government
of Jose Napolion Duarte elected in May
of 1984, ANDES continues to be harassed. Its union offices have been searched and files were taken illegally by government forces; the homes of union leaders
are under surveillance; and almost 5,000
teachers are unemployed.
With its 20th anniversary, however,
members of ANDES 21 DE JUNIO both
in El Salvador and in exile celebrated the
many gains of the past two decades: significant salary increases, health insurance
for teachers and their families, retirement
after 30 years of service, economic aid for
families of teachers who were victims of
the repression. The most recent victory, in
April of this year, is a salary increase of
110 colones (about $40) per month for all
teachers and administrative employees of
the Minstry of Education. This increase is
particularly meaningful because wages
have been frozen for the past several
years.
In addition to continuing to do education work and raise funds and materials
for ANDES, CAPA is currently developing a new slide show of the teachers' tour
to Nicaragua (August '84), and helping to
promote the November 6 referendum on
U.S. policy in Central America. CAPA is
also embarking on another major tour
project. The North American teachers
who visited Nicaragua laid the ground
work for a U.S. tour of representatives of
the Federation of Central American
Teachers Organizations (FOMCA). The
formation of FOMCA in 1982, brought
together the teachers' unions of El
Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
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Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama. Its
fundamental objective is to promote
education and to defend the rights of
educators in Central America in the face
of repression supported by the U.S.
government and the direct U.S. intervention.
Although modelled on the East Coast
ANDES Tour of last winter, the FOMCA
tour will require greater fundraising, outreach, and logistical coordination because
it is a national tour involving a number of
teacher representatives. But it is important that as many as possible in the United
States involve themselves in the decisions
their country makes about war and peace
in Central America. The FOMCA tour is
an ambitious project to aid that involvement by providing access to basic information through meetings with Central
American teachers themselves.
If you would like to help, or would like
more information about the tour project,
or about CAPA's work, please contact
Rachel Wyon, c/o CAPA 1151 Mass.
Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.
The Central America Teachers
Organizations support the work of
ANDES and its 20 year struggle for justice for the teachers and for all trade
unions in El Salvador. The National
Teachers' Platform for 1984-85 ends with
two demands that CAPA would like to
emphasize to the people of the United
States: To search for a negotiated political
solution to the conflict between the government of El Salvador and the FDRFMLN; and To cease immediately the intervention of the U.S. government in El
Salvador.
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Continued from Page Five
March 1984 claimed to have halted an
attempt by a Minnesota firm, E & F
Marketing, Inc., to ship $7 million in
M-60 tank parts to Iran. ( Wall Street
Journal, March 28, 1984)
11. WP, June 1, 1984
12. WP, February 29, 1984.
13. Philadelphia
Inquirer,
February 24, 1984.
14. NYT, March 29, 1984.
15. Financial Times, May 12, 1984.
16. MEPS, June 18, 1984.
17. WP, May 31 and June 6, 1984.
18. A Kuwaiti request for Stinger
missiles was rejected by Washington as
not "suitable" to Kuwaiti defense
needs. How those needs differed from
Saudi needs was not made clear. The
real reason may be that the inventory
of Stingers had been completely
depleted, and the Kuwaiti request
could only be met by delving into U.S.
stocks. ( Washington Post, June 20,
1984) The Kuwaitis responded by
entertaining an offer from the Soviet
Union for some $2-300 million worth
of air defense weapons systems.
19. London Times, June 8, 1984.
20. Ibid.
21. NYT, May 27, 1984.
22. MEPS, January 13, 1984.
23. NYT, June 27, 1984.
24. The major new pipeline option
now under consideration would run
540 miles from Iraqi oil fields to the
Jordanian port of Aqaba. Washington
has lent critical political and economic
support to this project. Politically, the
U.S. has passed on to Baghdad "verbal
assurances" that Israel would not attack the pipeline, which would run
close to the Israeli border at its terminal point. Economically the administration persuaded an initially
reluctant Export-Import Bank to
guarantee $425 million in U.S. commercial loans for the project. Iraq expects to raise another $500 million
from European sources. The project
includes a $570 million contract for
Bechtel Corporation, the corporate
nest of Secretary of State George
Shultz and Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger. Ex-Im Bank support was reportedly clinched by an
Iraqi agreement to order $100 million
worth of U .S.-made steel pipe instead
of cheaper West German or Japanese
steel for the pipeline itself. (New York
Times July 16, 1984)
25. Newsday, May 20, 1984.
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Black New York Action Committee,

Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up,

Central America Solidarity Coalition,

1878 Adam Clayton Powell Jr. Blvd.,
New York, NY 10026
The Black New York Action Committee is a small Harlem-based collective consisting of Black people from
all walks of life. There are professionals, workers, students and retirees
among the membership. The organization has been in existence since 1976
when a group of Black activists came
together out of a desire to respond in
some way to the New York City fiscal
crisis taking place at that time. The
impact of this crisis upon Black, nonwhite and poor people was devastating and they felt that a clear
analysis was necessary. Much of their
early practive consisted of educational
and agitational activities around the
state-appointed Emergency Financial
Control Board and the Municipal
Assistance Corporation. These agencies had, in essence, usurped the
governing authority in New York City. As the committee worked in the
Harlem community, they were increasingly convinced of the need to
become involved, as an organization,
in those struggles going on around
day-to-day needs of the people, and
where there was no struggle, to help
initiate it. Those areas of concern
were housing, education, drugs,
health, police brutality, etc. They also
saw that the rebuilding of Harlem and
communities like it would require a
number of skills and a lot of information for community people. Their
answer to these needs is the Fannie
Lou Hamer Institute, a cultural and
educational center which they hope
will meet these needs as they build it.
One of their activities through the Institute is the "Reels In Focus" Film
and Discussion Series. They hope to
do two things with this series. First,
they offer educational and informative experiences for neighborhood
people. Second, the dialogue that
develops from these film showings
helps them to get an understanding of
neighborhood people's political level
and concerns. This in turn helps them
to better understand how to proceed
with organizational efforts. Resist's
grant of $400 went toward the purchase of a 16mm projector for the
film series.

P.O. Box 190, Williamstown, VT
05679
Presently, there are 27 communities
in Vermont that have toxic waste
stored, buried or otherwise kept unsafe and the government and industry
have shown little or no interest in
dealing with these serious health
hazards. Recently, several activists
came together from a grassroots
organization to address this problem.
Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up
has been organizing informational
forums in towns where the hazardous
waste is located and they have pushed
to get the sites fenced off. They have
also successfully initated and
established citizens' action toxic waste
organizations in these towns by providing leadership training and
organizing skills. Some of the long
range goals of the group are: to uncover more toxic waste existing in the
state; to create an awareness of the
hazards of disposing toxic chemicals
in landfills; to create awareness and to
disseminate information on health
hazards due to enviornmental pollution and toxic waste specifically; to
create awareness on household hazardous waste and to develop a statewide pick-up system; to gather information from the EPA and universities
and to organize and diseminate this
material; to establish a workable
organization of citizens that will be a
pressuring wedge to force the government to act and make industry comply
with existing pollution laws; to
publicize routes of trucks carrying
hazardous waste; to make haulers display their placards on their trucks so
that people can know what is being
hauled; and to foster basic human
rights and build strength in persons to
demand respect. Resist's grant of $300
went towards the purchase of a copier
so that requests for information can
be fulfilled rapidly and efficiently.

1016 N. 9th St., Milwaukee, WI 53233
In January, 1979, a group of
Milwaukeeans who were knowledgeable about the conflict in Nicaragua
formed a group called the Committee
to Aid Nicaraguan Democracy
(CANO). The committee's goal was to
educate the public about the nature of
the Nicaraguan revolution, and to
support the Nicaraguan people
through the provision of
humanitarian aid. Throughout 1979,
many successful educational events
were held, the Committee's membership grew, and several shipments of
medical supplies and materials for the
literacy crusade were sent to
Nicaragua. In 1980, CANO members
saw the need to expand the committee's area of interest to El Salvador.
The group thus became the Committee to Aid Nicaraguan Democracy /Committee in Solidarity with
the people of El Salvador
(CAND/CISPES), and they included
El Salvador in their educational work.
In 1982, the membership decided that
a rgional perspective was essential to
convey the nature of the conflict in
Central America. They then became
the Central America Solidarity Coalition (CASC). Their goal is to halt
United States intervention in Central
America and they work toward this
goal by: building informed solidarity
in their community for the peoples of
Central America; encouraging elected
representatives to work for a new
foreign policy which would grant the
right of self-determination to the nations of Central America; and providing humanitarian aid to the Central
American people. Recently, CASC
decided that they needed to replace
their brochure with one that is up-todate. The brochure will be used for
educational outreach, membershipbuilding and fund-raising. Resist's
grant of $260 helped pay the production costs of the new brochure.
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